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Cork: Criminal Procedure - Warrant to Search Premises as Authorizing Se

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-WARRANT TO SEARCH PREMISES AS AUTHORIZING SEARCH AND DETENTION OF OCCUPANTS OF PREMISES; Michigan v. Summers, - U.S.
101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
-,

INTRODUCTION

The right of citizens to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures of their persons is protected by the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.' In Michigan v. Summers,' the United States Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether police may legally seize and detain an occupant of a house that is being searched for narcotics pursuant to a
valid search warrant even though there is no probable cause to believe such occupant has committed any offense. The Court held
that a warrant to search for contraband$ founded on probable
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is being conducted.' This case is significant because the Court has often
stressed the importance of warrant procedure, but has seldom
dealt with the means by which warrants are actually executed.'
The Court's ruling represents a serious threat to the Fourth
Amendment principle which requires that all seizures be based on
probable cause. A ruling by the Court that has an erosive effect on
the Fourth Amendment's protection against oppressive governmental intrusions should be carefully scrutinized.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, provides: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons to be seized." The Fourth Amendment has been
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment by Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. -U.S.-.,
101 S.Ct. 2587 (1981).
3. The Court expressly limited the scope of this holding to search warrants
for contraband rather than search warrants merely authorizing a search for evidence. Id. at
101 S.Ct. 2595, n.20.
4. Id. at
, 101 S.Ct. 2595.
5. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
-,
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THE CASE

As Detroit police officers were about to execute a warrant to
search a house for narcotics,' they observed Summers come out of
the house and proceed down the steps.7 The officers then detained
Summers on the sidewalk for limited inquiry and ascertained that
Summers was the owner-occupant of the house.' The police then
required Summers to re-enter the house and remain there while a
search of the house was conducted.' After discovering two bags of
heroin, the police officers formally arrested Summers and a custodial search revealed a bag of heroin on Summers' person."
At the trial for possession of the heroin found on his person,
Summers moved to suppress the heroin and quash the information."1 Summers argued that the pre-arrest "seizure" 1' was not
supported by probable cause' and, therefore, was an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 1 ' The trial court granted
Summers' motion to suppress the evidence. 1 ' A divided panel of
the Michigan Court of Appeals1 ' and the Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's order.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the scope of authority granted to police officers
6. The warrant did not name the owner of the house, nor did it specify any
persons to be searched. It was issued "to search the premises and seize heroin and
any other narcotics material and paraphernalia." People v. Summers, 407 Mich.
432, 441, 286 N.W. 2d 226, 226 (1979).
7. -. U.S-, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2589 (1981).
8. Id. at -,
101 S.Ct. at 2589, n.1.
9. Id..
10. The execution of the search warrant is described in greater detail in Mr.
Justice Moody's opinion for the Michigan Supreme Court. 407 Mich. at 441-442,
286 N.W. 2d at 226-227 (1979).
11. Id.

12. The initial detention of the defendant constituted a "seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has said: 'It must be
recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his

freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16
(1968).
13. Probable cause, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, was never
an issue in this case. The State did not contend that the officers had probable

cause to seize and detain the defendant. ._U.S. at_,

101 S.Ct. at 2590, n.3

(1981).
14. 407 Mich. at 441, 286 N.W. 2d at 227 (1979).

15. Id.
16. 68 Mich. App. 571, 243 N.W. 2d 689 (1976).
17. 407 Mich. 432, 286 N.W. 2d 226 (1979).
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in executing a search warrant."8
BACKGROUND

Before Terry v. Ohio,1'9 the general standard for determining
whether a seizure-detention was proper was not whether the police
officers' actions were reasonable under the circumstances, but,
rather, whether the police officers had probable cause 0 to arrest.'
While warrants were not required in all circumstances,2 the requirement of probable cause was treated as absolute.28 The Court

found that the standard of probable cause embodied the best compromise that has been found for accommodating the often opposing interests; safeguarding citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy, balanced against the interests of law
enforcement and the community's need for protection." The stan-

dard applied to all arrests,"5 without the need to "balance" the interests and circumstances involved in a particular situation.M
The first time the Court recognized an exception to the absolute requirement of probable cause was Terry v. Ohio.27 While formal arrests required probable cause because of their substantial invasion of personal security, less intrusive searches such as a "stop
and frisk" for weapons were held to a lesser standard; a balancing
test of the opposing interest of police officer's safety and individual
18. -U.S.-., 101 S.Ct. 2587 (1981).
19. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

20. "Probable Cause" exists where "the facts and circumstances within their
(the officers) knowledge and of what they had reasonable trustworthy information
are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense had been or is being committed." See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20-27 (1968); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164-165 (1949); Husty v.
United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 (1931); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S.
435 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925); Steele v. United
States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
21. -. U.S. at -,
101 S.Ct. at 2591 (1981).
22. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (felony arrest in a public place); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit).
23. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963).
24. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
25. The term "arrest" is often considered synonomous with those seizures
governed by the Fourth Amendment. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208
(1979).
26. 392 U.S. at 12 (1968).
27. Id. at 1.
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privacy. A "stop and frisk" search is limited to the discovery of
weapons as opposed to evidence and may be used only where the
police officer has a "reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and
presently dangerous.""8
The Court applied Terry to two subsequent cases involving
frisks for weapons. In Adams v. Williams,29 the Court held that an
officer could forcibly stop a suspect to investigate an informant's
tip that the suspect was armed and carrying narcotics.3 0 However,
the Court expressly limited the scope of its holding by saying:
"The purpose of the limited search is not to discover evidence of
crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without
fear of violence. . . ."3' In Pennsylvania v. Mimms," the Court
held that a police officer may order a driver to get out of a vehicle
being detained for traffic violations and frisk for weapons if the
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and
presently dangerous. 8 ' The Court balanced the State's legitimate
interest in police officers' safety against the intrusion into the personal liberty of the individual and concluded that the police officers' actions were reasonable."
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,'6 the Court applied Terry
in the special context of roving border patrols stopping
automobiles to check for illegal immigrants. These investigative
stops, which usually lasted less than a minute and involved a brief
question or two, were approved because of the unique governmental interest in protecting the nation's international borders and
preventing illegal immigration." The Court stated that "because of
the limited nature of the intrusions, stops of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount to probable cause required for
28. "When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous
to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the
officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is
in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm." Id. at 24.
29. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
30. The Court noted that the informant's tip was insufficient to justify an
arrest or search based on probable cause under the ruling in Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
31. 407 U.S. at 146 (1972).
32. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
33. Id. at 111-112.
34. Id.
35. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
36. Id. at 878-880.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/9
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In Dunaway v. New York, 88 the Court reaffirmed the general
rule that an official seizure of the person must be supported by
probable cause, even if no formal arrest is made.3 ' In Dunaway,
police officers located a murder suspect at a neighbor's house, and
without probable cause to arrest, took him into custody.40 The officers then transported the suspect to the police station where interrogations ultimately produced incriminating statements." The
Court held that the police officers' actions violated the Fourth
Amendment under the balancing test enunciated in Terry, not falling within the category of a "limited intrusion"."
In Ybarra v. Illinois,"s the primary issue was whether the
search of a customer in a tavern during the execution of a search
warrant of the premises was justified under the Terry test as a
frisk." The Court reaffirmed the Terry limitation; a frisk is justified only when an officer has reason to believe the individual confronted is "armed and presently dangerous". "5 The Court further
stated that the "narrow scope of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion
directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is tak37. Id. at 880. The Court expressly refused to expand Terry saying: "The
officer may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any

further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause." Id. at
881-882. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random checks for

vehicle registration and driver's licenses not permitted on less than articulable
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)

(fixed checkpoint to stop and check vehicles for illegal immigrants).
38. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
39. Id. at 216.
40. Id. at 203.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 216-219.
43. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
44. The search warrant authorized the police officers to search the tavern and
the person of the bartender for evidence of narcotics possession. The officers advised all those present that they intended to conduct a "cursory search for weapons." As one of these officers conducted a pat-down search of Ybarra, a customer,
he felt a cigarette pack with objects in it. After completing the pat-down of the

other customers, the officer returned to Ybarra, retrieved the cigarette pack, and
discovered packets containing heroin. Id. at 87-89.
45. Id. at 93-94.
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ing place.""
In summary, prior to Michigan v. Summers, the Court had approved only two types of seizures not based on probable cause. The
first, represented by the Terry line of cases, was a limited stop to
question a person and to perform a pat-down search for weapons
when the police have reason to believe the person is armed and
dangerous.47 The second, recognized in Brignoni-Ponce,was a brief
stop of vehicles near international borders to question occupants of
the vehicles about their citizenship."
ANALYSIS

In Michigan v. Summers," the Court held that a warrant to
search for contraband" which is founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of
the premises while a search is being conducted."1 The Court recognized that some Fourth Amendment seizures consistute such "limited intrusions" on the personal security of those detained that
they may be made on less than probable cause because they are
justified by substantial law enforcement interests. However, the
police must have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity to support the instrusion.5 2 If the Court determines that the
police officers' actions constitute a "limited intrusion", then the interests of law enforcement are subjected to a balancing test to determine if the harm of the intrusion is justified.
The first step of the balancing approach is to determine
whether the seizure and detention can be considered a "limited intrusion." The courts, in cases involving limited intrusions, seem to
have considered two main points: 1) how appropriate is the intrusion in light of the purpose for which the intrusion is made, and 2)
46. Id. at 94.
47. The Terry line of cases includes: Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973).
49. -U.S.-., 101 S.Ct. 2587 (1981).
50. The Court expressly limited the holding in this case to search warrants
for contraband rather than search warrants merely authorizing a search for evidence. Id. at 2595, n. 20.
51. The Court suggests that a different conclusion might be reached in "special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention." Id. at 2595, n. 21.
52. Id. at 2594.
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is the intrusion narrow enough to accomplish the purpose without
unduly restricting individual liberty. The factors the court considers are the duration of the intrusion, where the intrusion takes
place, and what personal liberties are being affected as well as to
what degree. In Summers, when a house was being searched for
contraband pursuant to a valid warrant, detention of an occupant
was justified as a "limited intrusion"." The Court reasoned that
detention in one's own home is only a minor inconvenience which
involves minimal indignity." The detention would not likely be exploited or unduly prolonged by police in efforts to gain more information because the search will normally produce the information
sought."
The second step in the balancing process is to assess the law
enforcement interests which may justify the intrusion. Some of the
generally recognized governmental interests include safety of police
officers and protecting the nation's international borders against
illegal immigration. Now, in Summers, the Court indicates two
other governmental interests to be served by limited intrusions:
prevention of flight and the orderly execution of a search warrant." Besides those two interests, the Court also discussed minimizing the risk of harm to police officers.' 7 The Court said that the
execution of a search warrant for narcotics is "the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence."" Risk of harm to police officers is minimized if they have the authority to exercise complete command of
the situation."9
The last step of the balancing process is to determine whether
there was a sufficient articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity to support the intrusion. 6 0 The cases do not define exactly
what is required to meet this standard. It appears that the experienced, prudent police officer must be able to articulate the facts
that led him to believe a limited intrusion was warranted in order
to protect the governmental interests being served. 1 In Summers,
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

-,

101 S.Ct. at 2593-94.

-,

101 S.Ct. at 2594.

60. Id.
61. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1968).
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the court felt that existence of a search warrant provided objective
justification for the detention of an occupant of a house subject to
the warrant because a judicial officer had determined that the police have probable cause to believe that someone in the house had
committed a crime.62 The connection of an occupant to that house
gives police officers an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies detention of
the occupant."
Comparing Summers to previous cases involving "limited intrusions," the Court does not seem to adequately address at least
two issues. First, does the governmental purpose served by the intrusion have to be unique or otherwise insurmountable? Second,
does the intrusion unduly restrict individual liberty? The result is
that the Court has established a third situation where an intrusion
does not have to be supported by probable cause, but, in so doing,
failed to provide clear guidelines that would serve predictability.
Unlike the law enforcement objectives that justified the police
conduct in the weapons frisk cases, the law enforcement objectives
in Summers represented nothing more than the ordinary police interests in discovering evidence of crime and apprehending
criminals," and the dissent points out that if a detention is not
supported by probable cause, the government has to demonstrate
"an important purpose beyond the normal goals of criminal investigation, or must demonstrate an extraordinary obstacle to such investigation." 6 The governmental interest in Terry was the assurance of police officers' safety when the officer reasonably believes
he may be dealing with an armed and dangerous person." In Summers, the police officers made no attempt to search the defendant
until they had thoroughly searched the house and formally arrested the defendant. 6 7 If the police officers had feared for their
safety, they could have performed a pat-down for weapons during
their initial contact with Summers. The Court merely speculates
that the officers may face a threat of harm in similar circumstances." The majority's reasoning that a threat of harm in similar
62.

-

U.S. at

-,

101 S.Ct. at 2594.

63. Id.
64. - U.S. at
101 S.Ct. at 2597. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in the dissent).
-,

65. Id.
66. Id. at
67. Id. at

-,

68. Id. at

-,

-,

101 S.Ct. at 2596.
101 S.Ct. at 2589.
101 S.Ct. at 2594.
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circumstances can only be minimized by granting police the broad
authority to detain the occupants while the house is being searched
overlooks the fact that the authority to "stop and frisk" for weapons granted in Terry achieves the same objective.
The border patrol cases presented an "extraordinary obstacle"
to the enforcement of immigration laws and involved "significant
economic and social problems" which justified the minimal intrusions on personal freedojn.'9 The law enforcement interest in
preventing flight is not unique to the execution of a warrant to
search for narcotics. Preventing flight is a law enforcement objective in nearly all criminal investigations. To allow police to seize
and detain a person without probable cause in order to make him
available for arrest in the event that probable cause is later developed makes the requirement of probable cause meaningless. The
fact that detention of the occupants may facilitate execution of the
search warrant does not constitute a unique governmental interest.
The dissent next focused its attack on the majority's conclusion that the police officers' actions should be considered "limited
intrusions."7 In the rare cases where the Court has permitted an
independent balancing of interests, the police intrusion has been
"extremely narrow."'7 1 The pat-down searches in Terry, Adams,
and Mimms were declared legal because they were extremely limited in time and degree of personal intrusion.7 ' The dissenters also
noted that in the border patrol cases the stops normally lasted less
than a minute and involved no more than a brief interrogation.7 3
The Court's explicit holding in Summers permits a detention
"while a proper search is being conducted. 71 4 This broad authority
allows police to make a person a prisoner in his own home for a
potentially long period of time.78
The holding in Summers established a third situation where a
person may be legally seized and detained by police without probable cause. The Court departed from the restrictive standards established in the prior cases which made it necessary for the government to demonstrate "an important purpose beyond the normal
69.
United
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 2596-97 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting from
States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879.).
Id. at
, 101 S.Ct. at 2598.
Id.
Id.
Id.

74. Id. at

-,

101 S.Ct. at 2595.

75. Id. at

-,

101 S.Ct. at 2598 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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goals of criminal investigation," or demonstrate "an extraordinary
obstacle to such investigation." There is also an indication by the
Court in Summers that a broader interpretation of what constitutes a "limited intrusion" on personal security will be applied.
CONCLUSION

A warrant to search for contraband which is founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain
the occupants of the premises while a proper search is being conducted. If the Court determines that police actions constitute a
"limited intrusion" on personal security, an independent balancing
process may be applied to determine whether the action is reasonable in light of the competing interests.
While the ruling in Summers is limited to situations involving
search warrants for narcotics, the Court's reasoning could be expanded to apply to other intrusions. The exception to the traditional requirement of probable cause established in Terry has been
expanded to create a new category of exceptions. Now there are
three categories of situations where probable cause is not necessary
to support an intrusion. Summers established a dangerous precedent because the government no longer needs to demonstrate any
unique or important objectives beyond the normal goals of criminal investigation or demonstrate an extraordinary obstacle to law
enforcement objectives. Summers also failed to establish clear
guidelines for predicting what will be considered a "limited intrusion." The intrusion permitted in Summers was substantially
broader than the special situations presented in the earlier cases.
This ruling poses a significantly greater threat to the protections
guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Federal Constitution imposes many restraints on the
power of law enforcement. Courts cannot make a practice of compromising those restraints simply to "facilitate" the interests of
law enforcement. Some inefficiency in law enforcement is a small
price to pay for freedom. In the words of Former United States
Supreme Court Justice Goldberg:
"We should not rush to abandon our autonomy as individuals just
because it creates inefficiencies in the apprehension of criminals.
When it is said that democracy is an inefficient means for determining policy, we do not rush to abandon democracy. We are jus76. Id. at

-,

101 S.Ct. at 2595.
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tifiably concerned with crime, but the power of the criminal is
nothing compared to the power of the state.""

Patrick C. Cork

77. Law Day Address by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg (April 29, 1981), reprinted in 15 AKRON L. REv. 1, 7 (1981).
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